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It is by now well established that politicians with an appealing appearance win more votes in 
elections (see, e.g., Todorov et al. 2005; Berggren et al. 2010; Lawson et al. 2010). After a 
number of studies demonstrating a relationship between appearance and electoral success, the 
challenge has been to establish causality and to determine what the political consequences are. 
Some studies have indeed provided evidence for the relationship being causal. Little et al. 
(2007) found that manipulation of facial photographs of real politicians can predict winners 
and losers in experimental elections. Lenz and Lawson (2011) showed that the positive 
relationship between votes and an appealing appearance is most pronounced among voters 
with low political knowledge who also watch a lot of TV. Such an interaction is exactly what 
one should expect from an underlying causal relationship. Ahler et al. (2015) carried out a 
field experiment and found that voters in their treatment group, who received ballots that 
included photographs, were considerably more likely to vote for a candidate with an 
appearance advantage.  
The political consequences of voters relying on candidates’ looks are still largely 
unknown. If one side of the political spectrum has a beauty advantage, it can expect greater 
electoral success and to have political decisions tilted in its favour.4 We put forward the 
hypothesis that politicians on the right look better, and that voters on the right value beauty 
more in a low-information setting.5 This is based on the observation that beautiful people earn 
more (Hamermesh and Biddle, 1994; Scholz and Sicinski, 2015) and that people with higher 
expected lifetime income are relatively more opposed to redistribution (Fong, 2001; Alesina 
and Giuliano, 2011). In accordance with this reasoning we show that politicians on the right 
are more beautiful than politicians on the left in Europe, the United States, and Australia.  
                                                     
4 Studies have documented a relationship between appearance and electoral success in Australia (King and 
Leigh, 2009), Brazil and Mexico (Lawson et al., 2010), Denmark (Laustsen, 2014), Finland (Poutvaara et al., 
2009; Berggren et al., 2010), France (Antonakis and Dalgas, 2009), Germany (Rosar et al., 2008), Ireland 
(Buckley et al., 2007), Japan (Rule at al. 2010), Switzerland (Lutz, 2010), the United Kingdom (Banducci et al., 
2008; Mattes and Milazzo, 2014) and the United States (Todorov et al., 2005; Ballew and Todorov, 2007; 
Atkinson et al., 2009; Benjamin and Shapiro, 2009; Olivola and Todorov, 2010). 
5 Budge and Robertson (1987, pp. 394–95) differentiate between left and right in terms of “economic-policy 
conflicts – government regulation of the economy through direct controls or takeover … as opposed to free 
enterprise, individual freedom, incentives and economic orthodoxy.” On the fruitful cross-national usage of left-
right terminology, see Bobbio (1996) and Mair (2007). 
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The general pattern that politicians on the right look better than politicians on the left 
implies that beauty can be used as a cue for ideology in low-information elections. We present 
a theoretical model in which beauty is used as such a cue for a conservative ideology in 
addition to being generally appreciated among voters. In low-information elections, the model 
predicts that beauty will benefit politicians on the right more than politicians on the left, since 
the use of beauty as an ideological cue among voters on the right works in tandem with the 
general appreciation of beauty. In high-information elections, the use of beauty as an 
ideological cue becomes less relevant and we expect beauty to benefit politicians on the left 
about as much as politicians on the right. These predictions are supported by experimental and 
observational evidence. 
 To analyse the electoral effects of beauty for candidates representing the left and the 
right, we turn to Finland, which is suitable for our analysis because of its proportional 
electoral system with multi-member districts, personal votes and within-party competition. 
Such a system allows us to study whether beauty matters more for candidates on the left or for 
candidates on the right, since electoral “beauty premia” can be calculated separately for 
different parties. Plurality-vote systems, in contrast, tend to have two main candidates who 
compete with each other, and candidates’ vote shares are either highly or perfectly negatively 
correlated, making it difficult or impossible to investigate whether the effect of candidate 
appearance differs between the left and the right.6 
We study beauty premia in municipal and parliamentary elections. The former can be 
regarded as low-information and the latter as high-information elections, where voters know 
little and reasonably much, respectively, about candidates. We show that in municipal 
elections, a beauty increase of one standard deviation attracts about 30% more votes for the 
average non-incumbent candidate on the right and about 15% more votes for the average non-
incumbent candidate on the left. In the parliamentary election, the corresponding figure is 
about 20% for candidates on the left and right alike. This makes clear that voters both on the 
left and on the right respond to beauty in both types of elections, but that voters on the right 
are more responsive in a low-information setting. 
Experimental election results confirm the observational findings from real elections. 
                                                     
6 Most of the studies on the relationship between appearance and electoral success focus on between-party 
competition and thus demonstrate that an appearance advantage has the potential to affect the political power 
balance and policy outcomes. Poutvaara et al., (2009), Berggren et al., (2010) and Lutz (2010) estimate beauty 
premia in within-party competition. 
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When matching candidates of similar age, the same gender and the opposite ideology in a 
random manner and asking respondents whom they would vote for solely on the basis of 
facial photographs, we find that candidates on the right win more often because they look 
better on average. Candidates on the right get a higher vote share, both from voters on the 
right and voters on the left, but with larger success among the former. The average margin of 
victory of the more beautiful candidate is also larger among voters on the right, indicating that 
they respond more to beauty. The similar patterns in real and in experimental elections 
suggest that the results in real elections reflect causal mechanisms. It is hard to see how 
reverse causality or omitted variable bias related to the election campaigns of candidates 
could influence voting in experimental elections by respondents from other countries, none of 
whom recognized any of the candidates. 
We proceed as follows. In Section 2, we use data from three continents and establish 
that politicians on the right look better. We then, in Section 3, present a model of how voters 
react to beauty in low- and high-information elections. In Section 4, we show that subjects in 
an experiment use beauty as a cue for conservatism, as predicted by our model. In Section 5, 
we use data from Finland and show that when candidates compete against others in the same 
party, the effect of beauty on votes is about the same for candidates on the right and on the 
left in high-information elections, but twice as large for candidates on the right in low-
information elections. Experimental election results in Section 6 confirm that voters on the 
right react more strongly to beauty in an election with no information apart from facial 
photographs of the candidates. Section 7 concludes. 
 
 
2. THE APPEARANCE GAP BETWEEN POLITICIANS ON THE LEFT AND ON THE 
RIGHT 
 
2.1.  The appearance gap on three continents 
 
In comparing beauty evaluations of politicians representing the left and the right, we make use 
of our own data from Europe (candidates in Finnish municipal and parliamentary elections; 
Members of the European Parliament, MEPs), our own data on U.S. candidates in senatorial 
and gubernatorial elections, based on photos from Todorov et al. (2005) and Ballew and 
Todorov (2007), as well as data from Australia (candidates in an election to the House of 
Representatives), collected by King and Leigh (2009). These data are described in Appendix 
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A.  
Beauty evaluations of candidates from Finland and the United States as well as of MEPs 
are based on the following question:7 
 
What is your evaluation of the physical appearance or attractiveness of this person 
compared to the average among people living in your country of residence? 
Very unattractive (1) 
Below average (2) 
Average (3) 
Above average (4) 
Very handsome or beautiful (5) 
Cannot say/Prefer not to answer 
 
Beauty evaluations from Australia were collected using a 9-point scale and were then 
normalized. We find that politicians on the right are more beautiful in Europe, the United 
States and Australia. Table 1 summarizes our findings.8  
 
TABLE 1 
Beauty advantages for politicians on the right 
 Beauty advantage (%) Data source 
Australia 32*** King and Leigh (2009) 
European Union 22*** Own data 
Finland 41***  Own data 
United States  14** Own data  
Notes: “Beauty advantage” is defined as the difference between the average beauty rating of politicians on the 
right and the left, expressed as a percentage share of the standard deviation of all politicians’ beauty ratings. *** 
and ** denote statistical significance at the 1% and 5% levels in one-sided t-tests of the null hypothesis that 
politicians on the right do not look better than politicians on the left. Australia: candidates for the House of 
Representatives; European Union: Members of the European Parliament; Finland: candidates in municipal and 
parliamentary elections; United States: candidates in Senate and gubernatorial elections. 
                                                     
7 For our data analysis, the replies were coded from 1 to 5, as indicated. 
8 In Appendix B.1, we explore our Finnish data further, presenting first average beauty evaluations and then 
showing that the beauty advantage of candidates on the right is robust and cannot be explained by the ethnicity, 
age, style or clothing of candidates, by the age, country or ideology of respondents, or by the quality of 
photographs. We also report that voters on the right value presence and style more than voters on the left. 
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2.2.  Explaining left-right differences in beauty 
 
A simple economic explanation of the appearance gap in favour of the right is that beautiful 
people earn more money (Hamermesh and Biddle, 1994; Mobius and Rosenblat, 2006; Scholz 
and Sicinski, 2015), and the more people earn, the more they are inclined to oppose 
redistribution (Alesina and Giuliano, 2011) and, arguably, to support, get active in and 
represent parties to the right. A more general psychological explanation could be that good-
looking people are more likely to perceive the world as a just place, since they are treated 
better than others (Langlois et al. 2000), achieve higher status (Anderson et al. 2001) and are 
happier (Hamermesh and Abrevaya, 2013) – and a frequent reason for people to sympathize 
with the left is a perception of the world as unfair.9 In line with this, it has been found that 
greater self-reported attractiveness is negatively related to a preference for egalitarianism, 
typically associated with the left: The more beautiful people consider themselves, the less 
they are in favour of redistribution (Price et al. 2011; Belmi and Neale, 2014).  
We are able to address this hypothesis using the National Longitudinal Study of 
Adolescent Health (Harris and Udry, 2012), which includes interviewer evaluations of 
physical attractiveness and self-reported ideological position from very liberal (in the 
American sense of the term, i.e., left-oriented) to very conservative for 4,789 American 
youths. We find that conservatism and beauty are positively correlated among men (see 
Appendix B.2 for the detailed results). As most U.S. politicians are men, these findings 
suggest that Republicans have an advantage in recruiting good-looking politicians. 
 
 
3. A MODEL OF VOTER RESPONSES TO BEAUTY 
 
We present a theoretical model of how voters react to beauty in high-information and in low-
information settings. We assume that politicians differ in their ideology (i) and beauty (b). 
Voters differ in their ideology and in how informed they are. Informed voters observe 
politicians’ beauty and ideology. Uninformed voters observe only politicians’ beauty. The 
fraction of informed voters is q, which may vary between elections. Politicians’ ideology 
obtains values on the unit interval, with smaller values corresponding to an ideology more to 
                                                     
9 In fact, Napier and Jost (2008) present results to the effect that people on the right are happier precisely because 
they do not see a need for egalitarianism, i.e., because they by and large perceive the world as a just place. 
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the left and larger values to an ideology more to the right. Beauty also varies between 0 and 1, 
with 0 being very unattractive and 1 being very attractive. 
There are two political candidates, A and B. Subscripts A and B are used to identify 
the candidate whose beauty or ideology is referred to. Without loss of generality, assume that 𝑏𝐴 ≥ 𝑏𝐵. We analyze the likelihood that voter j votes for candidate A. We denote an 
individual-specific popularity parameter in favor of candidate A by jσ , negative values 
implying a preference in favor of candidate B. It follows a uniform distribution on the interval �− Σ2 , Σ2�, where Σ is assumed to be large enough so that the probability of voting for A is 
always between 0 and 1. The individual-specific popularity parameter follows the same 
distribution among informed and uninformed voters. This individual-specific variable may 
depend on the candidate’s age, gender or any other characteristics than beauty and ideology 
that voters may care about. For an informed voter j, the utility in case politician A is elected is 𝑈(𝑖𝐴,𝑏𝐴) = −�𝑖𝑗 − 𝑖𝐴� + 𝛽𝑏𝐴 + 𝜎𝑗.       (1) 
The utility in case politician B is elected is  𝑈(𝑖𝐵, 𝑏𝐵) = −�𝑖𝑗 − 𝑖𝐵� + 𝛽𝑏𝐵.        (2) 
The term β reflects a general valuation of beauty.10 Denoting the ideological distance 
between candidate x and voter j by 𝑑𝑗,𝑥 = �𝑖𝑗 − 𝑖𝑥�,𝑥 ∈ {𝐴,𝐵}, we can write the condition that 
voter j votes for A as 
 −𝑑𝑗,𝐴 + 𝑑𝑗,𝐵 + 𝛽(𝑏𝐴 − 𝑏𝐵) + 𝜎𝑗 > 0.      (3)  
An uninformed voter does not observe a politician’s ideology, but forms an 
expectation of it, based on beauty: 𝑖𝑥𝐸 = 𝜇0 + 𝜇1𝑏𝑥, 𝑥 ∈ {𝐴,𝐵}.        (4) 
We assume that 𝜇0 ≥ 0; 𝜇1 > 0; 𝜇0 + 𝜇1 ≤ 1, corresponding to the idea that beauty serves as 
a cue for conservatism (as demonstrated empirically in the next Section), and that the 
perceived ideology of a politician is always between 0 and 1. In case politician A is elected, 
the expected utility of an uninformed voter j is 𝐸𝑈(𝑏𝐴) = −|𝑖𝑘 − 𝑖𝐴𝐸| + 𝛽𝑏𝐴 + 𝜎𝑗 .      (5) 
                                                     
10 This general appreciation of beauty in politics could be explained by beautiful people being perceived as more 
competent (Eagly et al., 1991) or by voters experiencing satisfaction when supporting good-looking candidates. 
On the evolutionary origins of an appreciation of beauty, see the original contribution by Darwin (1871) and 
recent evidence in Rhodes (2006). Besley and Coate (1997) explicitly mention a preference for good looks as a 
reason for voters to care about the identity of representatives in their citizen-candidate model. 
 8 
The expected utility in case politician B is elected is  
 𝐸𝑈(𝑏𝐵) = −�𝑖𝑗 − 𝑖𝐵𝐸� + 𝛽𝑏𝐵.        (6) 
Voter j votes for A if 𝐸𝑈(𝑏𝐴)> 𝐸𝑈(𝑏𝐵). We can now show: 
 
Proposition 1. The beauty premium of a candidate is 
𝛽Σ among informed voters, 𝛽+𝜇1Σ  among 
uninformed voters to the right of the expected position of the candidate, and 
𝛽−𝜇1Σ  among 
uninformed voters to the left of the expected position of the candidate. 
 
Proof. See Appendix C. 
 
Note that if 𝛽 < 𝜇1, there is a negative beauty premium among uninformed voters to the left. 
In the subsequent empirical analysis, we estimate beauty premia among the groups of voters 
described in Proposition 1. We also examine the relative size of 𝛽 and 𝜇1. 
 
 
4. BEAUTY AS A CUE FOR CONSERVATISM 
 
Voters using beauty as a cue for conservatism was a fundamental assumption in the 
theoretical model in Section 3. The assumption can be justified indirectly by the fact that 
candidates on the right are generally more beautiful than candidates on the left, as we 
demonstrated in Section 2. In this Section, we test the assumption directly, by conducting two 
experiments in which subjects are shown photos of members of the European Parliament, 
candidates in U.S. Senate and gubernatorial elections, as well as candidates in Finnish 
municipal and parliamentary elections. 
In the first experiment, subjects were shown photographs of either MEPs or U.S. 
candidates and were asked to indicate on a scale from 1 to 10 where they expected each 
politician to be located on a left–right scale ranging from 1 (farthest to the left) to 10 (farthest 
to the right).11 Subjects correctly placed MEPs representing party blocs that we classify as left 
to the left of MEPs representing party blocs that we classify as right (using the same 
classification as in Section 2).12 The average score on the 1–10 scale was 5.36 and 5.72 for 
                                                     
11 Subjects were not told that they were evaluating MEPs or U.S. candidates. 
12 Cf. Jahoda (1954) and Bull and Hawkes (1982), who found that MPs who were perceived to belong to the 
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MEPs representing the left and the right party bloc, respectively (std. dev. = 0.75; p-value of 
difference = 0.0000). For U.S. candidates, the average score was 5.47 and 5.66 for Democrats 
and Republicans, respectively (std. dev. = 0.94; p-value of difference = 0.02). 
How were subjects able to differentiate between politicians on the left and on the right 
in the manner just described? As made precise in our model in Section 3, we propose that 
voters use beauty as a cue for conservative ideology. To test whether they do, we regress the 
politicians’ inferred ideology on beauty evaluations from another pool of respondents, 
controlling for the gender and age of the politicians. We find that beautiful politicians, both in 
Europe and the United States, are placed farther to the right, as shown in Table 2.  
 
TABLE 2 
Regressions with inferred ideology as dependent variable  
 MEPs U.S. Senate and 
gubernatorial candidates 
















No. politicians 568 510 
R-squared 0.20 0.34 
Notes: The dependent variable is the average inferred ideology (on the 1–10 scale) of a politician, with 10 being 
farthest to the right. Coefficients are standardized. Robust standard errors in parentheses. ***, **, * denote 
statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels. All politicians in the sample represented either a party on 
the left or a party on the right. 
                                                                                                                                                                      
Conservative Party were rated as more attractive than MPs who were perceived to belong to the Labour Party. 
However, these early studies did not explore whether politicians on the right actually looked better. Rule and 
Ambady (2010) find that people are able to infer whether political candidates are on the left or on the right only 
by looking at their faces, which may be taken to support the interpretation that voters use facial appearance as a 
cue for non-egalitarianism or similar aspects of ideology. Tskhay and Rule (2013) demonstrate that experimental 
participants are often able to correctly characterize “perceptually ambiguous groups”, including the religious and 
political affiliation of persons in photographs or video clips. 
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In the second experiment, we asked subjects to indicate, on the basis of photographs 
alone, whether Finnish candidates represented the left or the right. These classifications, 
reported in Table 3, likewise offer support for beauty being used as a cue for conservatism. 
Regardless of the true party of the candidates, the average beauty of candidates classified as 
right exceeds that of candidates classified as left.  
 
TABLE 3 
Average beauty evaluations of Finnish candidates according to inferred ideology  
 Beauty Observations 
Candidates on the right inferred as right 2.96 (1.04) 1,658 
       p-value of difference 0.0001  
Candidates on the right inferred as left 2.82 (1.00) 1,401 
Candidates on the left inferred as right 2.67 (0.98) 2,218 
       p-value of difference 0.0006  
Candidates on the left inferred as left 2.58 (0.96) 3,080 
Notes: Standard deviations are in parentheses. Candidates on the right belong to the National Coalition Party. 
Candidates on the left belong to the Social Democratic Party or to the Left Alliance. One observation is one 
assessment of one candidate by one respondent. P-values are from one-sided t-tests of the null hypothesis that 
candidates on the right do not look better than candidates on the left. 
  
5. BEAUTY PREMIA ON THE LEFT AND ON THE RIGHT IN REAL ELECTIONS 
 
In this Section, we explore whether beauty is more electorally beneficial for political 
candidates on the right in municipal and parliamentary elections in Finland. Finland has a 
proportional electoral system in both municipal and parliamentary elections. Each voter has to 
vote for one candidate on a party list, which creates within-party competition among a large 
number of candidates. Candidates from a given party are elected in the order of their personal 
votes in their district. Each municipality is obliged by law to provide each party with the same 
number of slots for posters – and most posters contain photographs of all candidates of a 
party. Within-party competition in a proportional system allows us to study whether beauty 
matters more for candidates on the left or for candidates on the right; in one-member districts, 
vote shares of competing candidates are perfectly negatively correlated in two-party races and 
strongly negatively correlated also in the presence of smaller parties. Since we study the 
electoral effects of beauty in a system with within-party competition, it is important to note 
that although the ideology of candidates differs less within than between parties, cues about 
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ideology could still be informative about differences between candidates from the same party. 
In Appendix D, we use data from a voting aid application to show that there is significant 
within-party variation in candidates’ self-reported ideology. 
Electoral competition works quite differently at the municipal and at the national level. 
Municipal elections can be characterized as low-information elections – defined by Buckley 
et al. (2007, p. 176) as “elections which do not involve significant constitutional office and do 
not attract large scale media coverage” – because only a few candidates (especially among 
non-incumbents) are “career politicians” who are politicians by occupation or have a history 
of active campaigning and public visibility. Advertising is mainly restricted to posters and 
newspaper ads; hardly any candidates run individual campaigns on television or radio. By 
contrast, the parliamentary election can be characterized as one of high information. 
Parliamentary candidates are a more select group that is, for several reasons, more visible to 
the public. Many parliamentary candidates hold or have previously held seats at the municipal 
level and have a political history of which voters are aware. Candidates who spend large 
amounts of money on campaigning are mainly observed in the parliamentary election. In 
terms of the theoretical model in Section 3, it is reasonable to expect that the fraction of 
informed voters (q) is smaller in municipal than in parliamentary elections. 
We use regression analysis in order to investigate the relationship between beauty and 
electoral success. We define the Beauty of a candidate as the mean beauty assessment of his 
or her photograph among all respondents who evaluated it. Beauty is standardized to have a 
standard deviation of one. In order to make a clear distinction between low-information and 
high-information elections we focus on non-incumbent candidates. We use list fixed effects in 
our regressions in order to capture how beautiful a candidate is perceived to be in relation to 
the other candidates on the same list. We compare electoral competition within the National 
Coalition party on the right with that within the Social Democratic Party and within the Left 
Alliance on the left.13   
Our dependent variable, Relative success, is defined in the following way for candidate i 
on list j:  
 
Relative successi,j = (pi / vj) * 100                                                                    (7) 
                                                     
13 The pooling of candidates from the Social Democratic Party and the Left Alliance is supported by statistical 
tests; there is no specification in which we can reject that the beauty coefficients are equal for candidates from 
these two parties. 
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where pi is candidate i’s number of personal votes and vj is the number of all votes for 
candidates on list j divided by the number of candidates on list j. As the main explanatory 
variable, we use Beauty. This is in keeping with results found by Berggren et al. (2010) and 
Lutz (2010), showing that beauty evaluations have a higher explanatory power than 
competence evaluations, and Verhulst et al. (2010), demonstrating that beauty can be seen as 
a fundamental variable with halo effects on character-based inferences such as perceived 
competence. Beauty is interacted with Right, a dummy variable for candidates on the right 
(i.e., candidates who belong to the National Coalition Party). We also include a dummy 
variable for male candidates, both by itself and interacted with Right. 
Table 4 contains the regression results that allow us to compare the beauty coefficients 
of candidates on the left and on the right. Since our identification comes from the interaction 
of Beauty with the dummy variable Right, we include the interaction of all unreported dummy 
variables with Right in most specifications, but we do not report estimates for the full set of 
interaction terms in the table. The unreported dummies are Young, which denotes an age 
under 30, and Old, which denotes an age over 60, together with dummies for education. For 
both the municipal and the parliamentary elections, we report three specifications that differ 
in whether we control for education and whether we interact the variables with unreported 
coefficients (age and education) with Right. 
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TABLE 4 
Beauty premia in real elections 
 Municipal elections Parliamentary election 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Beauty 15.40*** 15.91*** 16.00** 24.47*** 23.90*** 20.98*** 
 (4.33) (4.62) (4.82) (5.90) (5.86) (5.90) 
Beauty × Right 15.59* 18.64** 15.00** -2.26 -.54 2.54 
 (7.94) (5.67) (5.86) (9.75) (9.20) (9.24) 
Male dummy -20.66 -33.84 -31.96 13.50 11.89 13.96* 
 (16.32) (19.31) (17.73) (6.99) (8.10) (7.04) 










Age dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Education dummies No No Yes No No Yes 
Unreported dummies    
interacted with Right 
No Yes Yes No Yes Yes 
List fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Number of candidates  682 682 682 485 485 485 
R-squared .02 .02 .03 .06 .06 .08 
Notes: The dependent variable is Relative success in the Finnish 2004 municipal and 2003 parliamentary 
elections. All studied candidates are non-incumbents. Candidates on the right belong to the National Coalition 
Party. Candidates on the left belong to the Social Democratic Party or to the Left Alliance. The education 
dummies are Comprehensive school or less (at most 10 years of schooling); Upper-secondary education 
(corresponds to 12 years of schooling); Vocational education (10–12 years of schooling); and University 
education (with a degree). Robust standard errors clustered at the list level are in parentheses. ***, **, * denote 
statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels. 
 
Columns (1)–(3) show that in the municipal elections, the beauty coefficient of 
candidates on the right is twice as large as that of candidates on the left (the total beauty 
coefficient of candidates on the right is obtained by adding the coefficients for Beauty and 
Beauty × Right). The beauty coefficients are not much affected by the inclusion of dummies 
for education. The positive beauty premium for candidates on the left in the low-information 
municipal election implies that 𝛽 > 𝜇1 in the model of voter responses to beauty in Section 3. 
The general appreciation of beauty gives rise to a stronger response among voters compared 
with the use of beauty as an ideological cue. 
 As shown in columns (4)–(6), the differences in estimated effects of beauty between 
candidates on the left and on the right that were evident in the municipal elections seem to be 
absent in the parliamentary election. There is a beauty premium for both candidates on the left 
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and on the right such that a beauty increase of one standard deviation attracts about 20% more 
votes for the average non-incumbent candidate.  
Using the estimates in Table 4 (columns 3 and 6), we have calculated the number of 
elected politicians who would not have been elected had there been no beauty differences 
within their electoral lists. For municipal elections, we find the numbers to be 2 out of 65 
politicians on the left (3.1%) and 9 out of 58 politicians on the right (15.5%). For 
parliamentary elections the figure for the left is 2 out of 64 politicians (3.1%) and for the right 
3 out of 39 politicians (7.7%). This is an indication of the share of politicians on each side that 
is elected because of their good looks.  
We finally note that a larger beauty premium on the right could reinforce the advantages 
enjoyed by political parties on the right when it comes to recruiting good-looking candidates. 
Good-looking supporters of parties on the right could respond to a higher responsiveness to 
beauty among voters on the right by an increased willingness to run for office, compared to 
good-looking supporters of parties on the left.  
 
 
6. BEAUTY PREMIA ON THE LEFT AND ON THE RIGHT IN AN EXPERIMENTAL 
ELECTION 
 
To investigate whether the higher beauty premium on the right reflects a causal mechanism, 
we have carried out an experimental election. For this election, we used 100 randomly 
selected photographs of candidates on the left from the Finnish elections and matched them 
with 100 photographs of candidates on the right. The matching was random subject to the 
constraints that the candidates should be of the same gender, of similar age and from the same 
type of election (municipal or parliamentary). Respondents were 41 non-Finns residing 
outside of Finland, primarily in Germany and Sweden. Since the photographs were the only 
information about the candidates available to respondents, we have a low-information election 
by construction. In terms of the theoretical model in Section 3, the fraction of informed voters 
(q) equals zero. 
What we can investigate in this low-information setting is whether candidates on the 
right win more often; whether this can be linked to better looks; and whether voter-
respondents on the right are more responsive to beauty in their voting choices. Not least, since 
facial photographs are the only information available to respondents, we can be sure that the 
experimental votes are cast based on this information; i.e., any relationship between candidate 
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appearance and votes cannot be driven by omitted variables such as candidate effort or 
monetary resources. For the same reason, the experimental election will support a causal 
interpretation of the real election results – if voting patterns are similar. 
Candidates on the right looked better in 61 of the 100 matched pairs (the p-value is 
0.018 in a one-sided binomial test of the null that the winning probability is not larger than 
0.5). The average beauty was 2.91 for candidates on the right and 2.61 for candidates on the 
left (the p-value of the difference is 0.0001 in a one-sided t-test). The candidates on the right 
are also the more successful in this experimental election, independently of the respondents’ 
own ideology – see Table 5. The comparison of the two electoral-success measures for voter-
respondents on the right and on the left provides a first indication that respondents on the right 
react more strongly to beauty differences.   
 
TABLE 5 
Electoral success for candidates on the right in an experimental election 
Respondent category: Left Right 
Share of races won by candidate on the right 0.60** 0.72*** 
Average vote share of candidate on the right 0.57*** 0.66*** 
Notes: A voter-respondent is on the right (left) if the answer to a question about whether redistribution in his or 
her country should be increased was “somewhat against” or “strongly against” (“somewhat in favour” or 
“strongly in favour”). *** and ** denote statistical significance at the 1% and 5% level. For the average vote 
share the significance levels refer to p-values from one-sided t-tests of the null hypothesis that the vote share 
does not exceed 0.5. For the share of races won by the candidate on the right the significance levels refer to p-
values from one-sided binomial tests of the null hypothesis that the probability of the right candidate winning is 
not larger than 0.5 in each pairwise election. Number of respondents on the right (left): 15 (21). 
 
To test whether respondents on the right react more strongly to beauty differences, we 
present regression results from the same low-information setting. In Table 6 we report results 




Beauty in an experimental election  
 (1) (2) 
  Vote for the first candidate  Vote for the first candidate  






Right respondent × Beauty gap  0.06*** 
(0.02) 






R-squared 0.14 0.14 
Observations 2668 2668 
Notes: The first (second) candidate refers to the candidate whose photograph was placed to the left (right) on the 
survey page. The dependent variable is a dummy=1 for voting for the candidate placed first. The beauty gap is 
the average beauty score of the first candidate minus the average beauty score of the second candidate. Robust 
standard errors are in parentheses. ***, **, * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels. 
According to F-tests, neither of the constants differs from 0.5 at the 10% significance level. The sample includes 
respondents who are either classified as being ideologically on the left or on the right. “Abstain from voting” 
responses are excluded. 
 
Column (1) reveals that respondents are more likely to vote for a candidate the larger 
that candidate’s beauty advantage is. Column (2), in which Beauty gap is interacted with 
being a respondent on the right, shows that voters on the right respond more to beauty than 
voters on the left. In line with our findings for real elections in Section 5, the estimates 
indicate that voter responses based on a general appreciation of beauty (𝛽) are larger than 
voter responses based on the usage of beauty as an ideological cue (𝜇1). Coefficient sizes are, 
however, not directly comparable across the different settings in Sections 5 and 6. 
To sum up, we find that candidates on the right outperform candidates on the left in an 
experimental election and that the superior performance of candidates on the right can be 
linked to their beauty advantage – especially among respondents on the right. This supports a 
causal interpretation of our findings for real elections.  
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7. SUMMARY AND DISCUSSION 
 
Many studies have shown that candidate appearance is related to electoral success, but so far 
it has not been explored whether this favours one political side over the other. Our study 
addresses this question and makes three contributions to the literature on appearance-based 
voting. 
First, we show that politicians on the right are more beautiful than politicians on the left 
in Europe, the United States and Australia. This is bound to have political consequences, as 
their beauty advantage, all else equal, makes candidates on the right more likely to win office 
and implement their preferred policies. 
Our second contribution is to formulate a theoretical model of voter responses to 
beauty. In the model, voters’ responses to beauty depend on their ideology and available 
information. In addition to a general appreciation of beauty, we propose that voters use beauty 
as a cue for candidate ideology in settings in which they do not know much about candidates 
apart from their facial appearance. Our explanation is that beautiful people tend to have both 
higher incomes and higher social status and are therefore more likely to see the world as just 
place and embrace conservative values. The model predicts that uninformed voters use 
candidate looks as a cue for a conservative ideology, resulting in a larger beauty premium on 
the right. 
Our third contribution is to show empirically that voters indeed use beauty as a cue for 
candidate ideology, and that politicians on the right benefit more from beauty in low-
information elections. Better-looking politicians are inferred to stand further to the right, 
independently of which party they really represent. We find that the beauty premium is twice 
as large among candidates on the right than among candidates on the left in real low-
information elections, but about the same in real high-information elections. An experimental 
election confirms that voters favour better-looking candidates, and that conservative voters do 
so to a larger extent. The general appreciation of beauty among voters means that politicians 
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APPENDIX A: PRESENTATION OF DATA 
 
In this Appendix we present our data on beauty evaluations (described in Section A.1. and 
used throughout the paper), on inferred ideology (described in Section A.2. and used in 
Section 4) and on voting in an experimental election (described in Section A.3. and used in 
Section 6). 
 
A.1.  Beauty evaluations 
 
Finland, municipal and parliamentary candidates: Our data on the beauty of municipal and 
parliamentary Finnish candidates were collected in a web survey. The survey included 1,356 
facial photographs of candidates, which were evaluated by an average number of nine 
respondents each. The photographs were divided into 684 of women and 673 of men; 575 
from the 2003 parliamentary election and 782 from the 2004 municipal elections; and 1,170 
of non-incumbents and 187 of incumbents. Respondents were informed that they were 
evaluating political candidates, but were not given any other information about the 
photographs. The photographs had previously been displayed by the political parties on their 
campaign posters, as well as in newspaper ads. The 2,513 respondents were from outside of 
Finland to ensure that the candidates were not recognized. The majority of the respondents 
were from the United States (32%) or Sweden (31%), but we also had significant participation 
from France (9%), Germany (8%), and Denmark (5%). Each respondent was shown four 
photographs (two of men and two of women), one at a time, randomly chosen from the 
database of photographs, and was asked to evaluate each photograph. Our main question was: 
 
What is your evaluation of the physical appearance or attractiveness of this person 
compared to the average among people living in your country of residence? 
Very unattractive (1) 
Below average (2) 
Average (3) 
Above average (4) 
Very handsome or beautiful (5) 
Cannot say/Prefer not to answer 
 
For the data analysis, the replies were coded from 1 to 5, as indicated above.   
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Members of the European Parliament: Beauty evaluations of Members of the European 
Parliament were collected in a survey in which each of 30 respondents evaluated the official 
photographs from the web page of the European Parliament of all 736 MEPs from the 2009–
2014 parliamentary term. The respondents were research assistants and students from 
Germany (n=19), the U.S. (5), Finland (2), Sweden (2), Croatia (1) and India (1). They were 
not given any information about the persons in the photographs.  
The question in this survey was: 
 
What is your evaluation of the beauty or attractiveness of this person compared to 
people in general? 
Very unattractive (1) 
Rather unattractive (2) 
About average (3) 
Rather attractive (4) 
Very attractive (5) 
Don’t know or don’t want to answer 
 
For the data analysis, the replies were coded from 1 to 5, as indicated above. 
 
 
U.S. Senate and gubernatorial candidates: Beauty evaluations of U.S. candidates were 
collected in a survey in which each of 19 respondents evaluated 301 candidates running in 
Senate elections from 2000 to 2008 and 248 candidates running in gubernatorial elections 
from 1995 to 2006. We used the same photos as Todorov et al. (2005) and Ballew and 
Todorov (2007), generously provided by Alexander Todorov. We excluded Barack Obama 
and all responses in which the respondents claimed to recognize the candidate. The 
respondents were research assistants and students from Germany (n=7), the Czech Republic 
(4), Canada (2), Spain (2), Sweden (2), China (1) and Ukraine (1). The respondents were not 
given any information about the photographs.  
 




What is your evaluation of the physical appearance or attractiveness of this person 
compared to the average among people living in your country of residence?  
Very unattractive (1) 
Below average (2) 
Average (3) 
Above average (4) 
Very handsome or beautiful (5) 
Cannot say 
Prefer not to answer 
 
For the data analysis, the replies were coded from 1 to 5, as indicated above. 
 
Australia: For Australian candidates, we rely on data from King and Leigh (2009), who 
asked four Australian respondents to rate the physical attractiveness of 286 candidates in the 
2004 election to the federal House of Representatives. The candidates represent one party to 
the left, the Australian Labor Party, and two parties to the right, the Liberal Party of Australia 
and the National Party. The two latter parties operate in coalition with one another and do not 
run candidates against a sitting member of the other party. King and Leigh used candidate 
photographs from archived versions of party websites and were able to verify that almost all 
of these photographs were used on the How-to-Vote cards that party representatives hand out 
to voters at polling stations. They measured physical attractiveness on a scale from 1 to 9 and 
asked their respondents to try to maintain an average rating of 5. The scores of each individual 
rater were standardized to a mean of 0 and a standard deviation of unity. Beauty ratings were 




A.2.  Data on inferred ideology (used in Section 4) 
 
We conducted one experiment in which subjects were asked to infer the ideology of members 
of the European Parliament and of candidates in U.S. Senate and gubernatorial elections, and 
another experiment in which subjects were asked to infer the ideology of candidates in 
Finnish municipal and parliamentary elections. 
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Members of the European Parliament: Each of 22 respondents evaluated the official 
photographs (that were collected from the web page of the European Parliament) of all 736 
MEPs from the 2009–2014 parliamentary term. The 22 respondents were from Germany 
(n=13), the United States (4), Finland (2), Sweden (2) and Austria (1). The respondents were 
not told anything about the photographs that they were evaluating. The main question was: 
“In political matters, people talk of “the left” and “the right.” Where would you expect this 
person to stand on this scale? Please indicate a numerical answer from 1 (farthest to the left) 
to 10 (farthest to the right).” 
 
U.S. Senate and gubernatorial candidates: Each of 11 respondents evaluated 301 
candidates running in Senate elections from 2000 to 2008 and 248 candidates running in 
gubernatorial elections from 1995 to 2006. We used the same photos as Todorov et al. (2005) 
and Ballew and Todorov (2007), generously provided by Alexander Todorov. The 
respondents were research assistants and students from Germany (n=4), the Czech Republic 
(3), Sweden (2), Canada (1), and Slovakia (1). We excluded Barack Obama and all responses 
in which the respondents claimed to recognize the candidate. The main question was: “In 
political matters, people talk of ‘the left’ and ‘the right.’ Where would you expect this person 
to stand on this scale? Please indicate a numerical answer from 1 (farthest to the left) to 10 
(farthest to the right).” 
 
Finland, municipal and parliamentary candidates: In the second experiment, which was 
part of the Finnish appearance survey described in Section A.1 above, we asked subjects to 
classify Finnish municipal and parliamentary candidates as representing either the left or the 
right, based on facial photographs only. Their classifications were then compared with our 
classifications of the real parties of the candidates. We classified candidates belonging to the 
National Coalition Party as being on the right and candidates belonging to the Social 
Democratic Party or to the Left Alliance as being on the left. 
 
 
A.3.  Voting in an experimental election (used in Section 6) 
 
For the experimental election we used 200 photographs of candidates from the Finnish 
municipal and parliamentary elections described in section A.1. The photographs were 
selected as follows. We randomly selected 50 photographs of men and 50 photographs of 
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women from the left (the Social Democratic Party or the Left Alliance), and then matched 
each photograph with a photograph of a candidate of the same gender in the same district 
from the right (the National Coalition Party). Candidates were matched by choosing the 
candidate from the right who was closest in age. The 39 respondents were mostly from 
Germany (n=30) but also from Sweden (3) as well as single respondents from Australia, 
Croatia, Denmark, Norway, Russia and Switzerland. Each respondent was shown the 100 
matched pairs and given the following instructions: “Sometimes people vote in an election 
with very little information. Let us assume that you had the choice of voting for one of these 
persons as a member of Parliament, or abstain from voting. Which would be your choice? 
Please mark your choice by typing ‘X’ on the relevant line”. For each pair of photographs 
there were three reply alternatives: 
 
• Vote for the person to the left 
• Vote for the person to the right 
• Abstain from voting 
 
For each pair, the candidate photograph that was placed to the left was determined by chance. 





APPENDIX B: TABLES AND TEXT TO SECTION 2 
  
B.1.  About Finnish candidates 
 
TABLE B1 
Average beauty evaluations of Finnish candidates 
Election type Municipal Parliamentary 
Candidates on the right 2.89 (0.71) 2.93 (0.62) 
   p-value of difference 0.000 0.000 
Candidates on the left 2.59 (0.61) 2.70 (0.67) 
Female candidates on the right 3.08 (0.79) 3.06 (0.67) 
   p-value of difference 0.000 0.000 
Female candidates on the left 2.63 (0.67) 2.82 (0.74) 
Male candidates on the right 2.68 (0.53) 2.78 (0.51) 
    p-value of difference 0.045 0.002 
Male candidates on the left 2.56 (0.60) 2.56 (0.56) 
Total No. of candidates 780 575 
Notes: Finland: candidates on the right belong to the National Coalition Party, and candidates on the left belong 
to the Social Democratic Party or to the Left Alliance (none of the respondents recognized any of the 
candidates). One observation is the average evaluation of one candidate. Standard deviations are in parentheses. 
P-values are from a t-test of equal means between candidates on the left and on the right. 
 
The differences between Finnish candidates on the left and on the right cannot be explained 
by age differences: The mean age of candidates on the left and on the right differs by less than 
one year. Moreover, the age of the respondents does not noticeably affect beauty evaluations. 
Could our findings reported in Table B1 be explained by candidate ethnicity, style or 
clothing or by the ideology of respondents? In the case of the Finnish parliamentary election, 
ethnicity does not have any significant impact on the results, since only 1.1% of candidates on 
the right and 1.8% of candidates on the left have immigrant backgrounds, based on their 
photographs. A potential problem relating to the validity of the evaluations, however, is that 
candidates on the left and on the right may choose to present themselves in somewhat 
different fashions (e.g., with regard to clothing). Therefore, there is a risk that the evaluations 
reflect the political orientations of respondents. In particular, our use of foreign respondents 
could be problematic if, for instance, U.S. respondents are more conservative on average and, 
therefore, evaluate political candidates on the right as relatively better looking. 
We address these issues from three angles. First, we divide respondents according to 
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their views on taxes and redistribution in order to investigate whether the evaluation 
differences are driven by the political orientations of respondents. Second, we divide the 
candidates by how formally they dress and compare the beauty and competence evaluations of 
candidates on the left and on the right. Third, we compare the evaluations of Swedish and 
U.S. respondents. 
As reported in Table B2, the beauty differences between candidates on the left and on 
the right remain both for respondents on the left and on the right (as classified by whether 
they agree or disagree with the suggestion “to increase taxes on those with high incomes in 
your country, and distribute the money to those with low incomes”). Moreover, candidates on 
the right have an appearance advantage irrespective of whether they are dressed formally 
(which could be taken to signal conservatism) or not (see Table B3); they are also perceived 
as more beautiful by respondents both from Sweden and from the United States (see Table 
B4). We conclude that the higher beauty evaluations of candidates on the right do not reflect 
the political opinions of respondents. 
 
TABLE B2 
Average evaluations according to respondent ideology 
Candidates Respondents Beauty Number of candidates 
Right Right 2.94 (0.72) 225 
p-value of difference  0.000  
Left  Right 2.63 (0.71) 451 
Right Left 2.85 (0.78) 204 
p-value of difference  0.006  
Left Left 2.66 (0.77) 365 
Notes: Standard deviations are in parentheses. The table contains Finnish candidates both from the municipal 
and from the parliamentary elections. Candidates on the right belong to the National Coalition Party. Candidates 
on the left belong to the Social Democratic Party or to the Left Alliance. One observation is the average 
evaluation of one candidate. Respondents to the right “strongly disagree” or “somewhat disagree” with the 
suggestion “to increase taxes on those with high incomes in your country, and distribute the money to those with 
low incomes”. Respondents to the left “strongly agree” or “somewhat agree” with the same suggestion. P-values 




Average evaluations according to candidate attire 
Candidates 
 
Tie (male) or blouse 
and/or suit (female) 
Beauty Number of candidates 
Right No 2.89 (0.67) 114 
p-value of difference  0.000  
Left No 2.65 (0.62) 420 
Right Yes 2.91 (0.67) 351 
p-value of difference  0.000  
Left Yes 2.62 (0.65) 471 
Notes: Standard deviations are in parentheses. The table contains Finnish candidates both from the municipal 
and from the parliamentary elections. Candidates on the right belong to the National Coalition Party. Candidates 
on the left belong to the Social Democratic Party or to the Left Alliance. One observation is the average 
evaluation of one candidate. P-values are from a t-test of equal means between each pair of average evaluations 
for candidates on the right and on the left. 
 
TABLE B4 
Average evaluations according to respondent country 
Candidates Respondent country Beauty Number of candidates 
Right Sweden 2.91 (0.75) 123 
p-value of difference  0.001  
Left Sweden 2.63 (0.78) 244 
Right  United States 2.97 (0.81) 180 
p-value of difference  0.000  
Left United States 2.63 (0.79) 346 
Notes: Standard deviations are in parentheses. The table contains Finnish candidates both from the municipal 
and from the parliamentary elections. Candidates on the right belong to the National Coalition Party. Candidates 
on the left belong to the Social Democratic Party or to the Left Alliance. One observation is the average 
evaluation of one candidate. P-values are from a t-test of equal means between each pair of average evaluations 
for candidates on the right and on the left. 
 
A further concern is that the appearance gap in favor of politicians on the right could 
result from differences in the quality of photographs; perhaps parties on the right spend more 
on photographers so that their candidates look better in campaign material. We tested for 
photograph-quality differences by having two men and two women from Germany and from 
Sweden evaluate the 100 randomly selected pairs of photographs of Finnish candidates used 
in the experimental election. This photograph-quality evaluation was conducted 
independently of the collection of appearance ratings. Respondents indicated whether one of 
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the photographs was of higher quality, whether the photographs were of similar quality or 
whether an assessment could not be made, and in so doing they were explicitly instructed to 
disregard any aspects concerning the appearance of the persons in the photographs. 
Photographs of candidates on the left were evaluated to be of higher quality in 57% of the 
cases, and photographs of candidates on the right in 34% of the cases.14 Therefore, the 
appearance gap in favor of candidates on the right does not seem to be driven by the quality of 
the photographs. If anything, the photograph-quality evaluations may be taken to imply that 
we underestimate this gap. 
Finally, in the Finnish National Election Study (Karvonen and Paloheimo 2003), more 
than one third of voters reported that they were influenced by the presence and style of 
candidates and more than one fifth by their election campaigns and advertisements: see Table 
B5, with separate numbers for voters on the right and on the left. For our purposes, it is eye-
catching that voters who are politically to the right state that they were more influenced by 
presence and style, and campaigns and advertisements, whereas voters to the left say that they 
were more influenced by the gender of candidates. 
                                                     
14 Furthermore, although there is a positive correlation between photograph quality and beauty evaluations, 
candidates on the right are evaluated as better looking both in photographs that are of lower and of higher quality 




Factors that influenced Finnish voters in choosing parliamentary candidates 
Influence Share of voters on the left 
being significantly or 
somewhat influenced by 
Share of voters on the right 
being significantly or 
somewhat influenced by 
Candidate’s gender 38% 32% 
Candidate’s age 31% 28% 
Candidate’s educational background 31% 56% 
Candidate’s experience in politics 63% 62% 
Candidate’s presence and style 34% 39% 
Candidate’s fame 33% 37% 
Candidate’s views and comments 80% 87% 
Candidate represents the party 
supported by the voter 
73% 85% 
Candidate’s election campaign and 
advertisements 
21% 25% 
Recommendations of a friend, 
acquaintance, or relative 
9% 10% 
Comments and support of a non-
governmental organization 
5% 6% 
Notes: Candidates on the left belong to the Social Democratic Party or to the Left Alliance. Candidates on the 
right belong to the National Coalition Party. The percentages presented refer to replies from voters of these three 
parties. Source: Karvonen and Paloheimo (2013). 
 
 
B.2.  More on Harris and Udry (2012) 
 
Lastly, we refer to Harris and Udry (2012). On the 1–5 scale, conservative or very 
conservative respondents receive the average rating of 3.45 and liberal or very liberal 
respondents the average rating of 3.32. The difference corresponds to 0.16 standard deviations 
and is statistically significant at the 1% level. Among women, the difference is smaller and 
not statistically significant. 
This research uses data from Add Health, a program project designed by J. Richard 
Udry, Peter S. Bearman, and Kathleen Mullan Harris, and funded by a grant P01-HD31921 
from the Eunice Kennedy Shriver National Institute of Child Health and Human 
Development, with cooperative funding from 17 other agencies. Special acknowledgment is 
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due Ronald R. Rindfuss and Barbara Entwisle for assistance in the original design. Persons 
interested in obtaining data files from Add Health should contact Add Health, Carolina 
Population Center, 123 W. Franklin Street, Chapel Hill, NC 27516-2524 




APPENDIX C: PROOF OF PROPOSITION 1 (IN SECTION 3) 
 
Informed voters 
We first calculate the beauty premia for candidates A and B when informed voter j decides 
whom to vote for, taking into account the probability distribution of the individual-specific 
popularity parameter 𝜎𝑗. According to equation (3), the cutoff value of 𝜎𝑗 above which j votes 
for A is given by 𝜎�𝑗 = 𝑑𝑗,𝐴 − 𝑑𝑗,𝐵 − 𝛽(𝑏𝐴 − 𝑏𝐵). 
Given that 𝜎𝑗 follows a uniform distribution between −Σ/2 and Σ/2, the probability of j 
voting for A is given by 𝑝𝑗,𝐴 = (𝛴2 − 𝜎�𝑗)/Σ. Differentiating this with respect to 𝑏𝐴 gives as the 
beauty premium 𝜕𝑝𝑗,𝐴/𝜕𝑏𝐴 = 𝛽/Σ. Correspondingly, 𝜕𝑝𝑗,𝐴𝜕𝑏𝐵 = − 𝛽Σ, implying that 𝜕𝑝𝑗,𝐵𝜕𝑏𝐵 = 𝛽Σ. (As 
there are two candidates, 𝑝𝑗,𝐴 + 𝑝𝑗,𝐵 = 1.) Among informed voters, the beauty premium is the 
same for A and B. 
 
Uninformed voters 
If citizen j is uninformed, we can distinguish three cases: (i) 𝑖𝑗 ≤ 𝜇0 + 𝜇1𝑏𝐵; (ii)  𝜇0 +𝜇1𝑏𝐵 < 𝑖𝑗 ≤ 𝜇0 + 𝜇1𝑏𝐴; (iii) 𝑖𝑗 > 𝜇0 + 𝜇1𝑏𝐴. Case (i) corresponds to voters on the left, case 
(ii) to voters in the centre and case (iii) to voters on the right.  
 
In case (i), inserting equation (4) into equations (5) and (6) gives 𝐸𝑈(𝑏𝐴) = −𝜇0 − 𝜇1𝑏𝐴 + 𝑖𝑗 + 𝛽𝑏𝐴 + 𝜎𝑗 ,       𝐸𝑈(𝑏𝐵) = −𝜇0 − 𝜇1𝑏𝐵 + 𝑖𝑗 + 𝛽𝑏𝐵.        
The cutoff value of 𝜎𝑗 above which j votes for A is given by 
 𝜎�𝑗 = (𝛽 − 𝜇1)(𝑏𝐵 − 𝑏𝐴). 
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Given that 𝜎𝑗 follows a uniform distribution between −Σ/2 and Σ/2, the probability of j 
voting for A is given by 𝑝𝑗,𝐴 = (𝛴2 − 𝜎�𝑗)/Σ. Differentiating this with respect to 𝑏𝐴 gives 𝜕𝑝𝑗,𝐴/𝜕𝑏𝐴 = (𝛽 − 𝜇1)/Σ. Differentiating this with respect to 𝑏𝐵 gives 𝜕𝑝𝑗,𝐴𝜕𝑏𝐵 = (𝜇1 − 𝛽)/Σ, 
implying that 
𝜕𝑝𝑗,𝐵𝜕𝑏𝐵 = 𝛽−𝜇1Σ . Therefore, the beauty premium is the same for A and B. 
 
In case (ii), inserting equation (4) into equations (5) and (6) gives 𝐸𝑈(𝑏𝐴) = −𝜇0 − 𝜇1𝑏𝐴 + 𝑖𝑗 + 𝛽𝑏𝐴 + 𝜎𝑗 ,     𝐸𝑈(𝑏𝐵) = 𝜇0 + 𝜇1𝑏𝐵 − 𝑖𝑗 + 𝛽𝑏𝐵.       
The cutoff value of 𝜎𝑗 above which j votes for A is given by 𝜎�𝑗 = 2𝜇0 − 2𝑖𝑗 + 𝜇1(𝑏𝐴 + 𝑏𝐵) − 𝛽(𝑏𝐴 − 𝑏𝐵). 
Given that 𝜎𝑗 follows a uniform distribution between −Σ/2 and Σ/2, the probability of j 
voting for A is given by 𝑝𝑗,𝐴 = (𝛴2 − 𝜎�𝑗)/Σ. Differentiating this with respect to 𝑏𝐴 gives 𝜕𝑝𝑗,𝐴/𝜕𝑏𝐴 = (𝛽 − 𝜇1)/Σ. Differentiating this with respect to 𝑏𝐵 gives 𝜕𝑝𝑗,𝐴𝜕𝑏𝐵 = −(𝛽 + 𝜇1)/Σ, 
implying that 
𝜕𝑝𝑗,𝐵𝜕𝑏𝐵 = (𝛽 + 𝜇1)/Σ . Therefore, the beauty premium is larger for B than for A. 
 
In case (iii), inserting equation (4) into equations (5) and (6) gives 𝐸𝑈(𝑏𝐴) = 𝜇0 + 𝜇1𝑏𝐴 − 𝑖𝑗 + 𝛽𝑏𝐴 + 𝜎𝑗 ,  𝐸𝑈(𝑏𝐵) = 𝜇0 + 𝜇1𝑏𝐵 − 𝑖𝑗 + 𝛽𝑏𝐵.     
The cutoff value of 𝜎𝑗 above which j votes for A is given by 
 𝜎�𝑗 = (𝛽 + 𝜇1)(𝑏𝐵 − 𝑏𝐴). 
 
Given that 𝜎𝑗 follows a uniform distribution between −Σ/2 and Σ/2, the probability of j 
voting for A is given by 𝑝𝑗,𝐴 = (𝛴2 − 𝜎�𝑗)/Σ. Differentiating this with respect to 𝑏𝐴 gives 𝜕𝑝𝑗,𝐴/𝜕𝑏𝐴 = (𝛽 + 𝜇1)/Σ. Differentiating this with respect to 𝑏𝐵 gives 𝜕𝑝𝑗,𝐴𝜕𝑏𝐵 = − 𝛽+𝜇1Σ , 
implying that 
𝜕𝑝𝑗,𝐵𝜕𝑏𝐵 = 𝛽+𝜇1Σ . Therefore, the beauty premium is again the same for A and B. 
 
To sum up cases (i), (ii) and (iii): among uninformed voters, the beauty premium of a 
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candidate is (𝛽 − 𝜇1)/Σ among voters to the left of the candidate’s expected ideological 




APPENDIX D: DATA FROM FINNISH VOTING AID APPLICATION (USED IN 
SECTION 4) 
 
To capture ideological differences between candidates we use data from a voting aid 
application provided by Helsingin Sanomat (Finland’s biggest newspaper) for the 2015 
parliamentary election. We use candidates’ responses to the following statement to capture 
their ideology:  
 
Labour income taxes should be increased on those with high incomes. 
(1) Fully disagree 
(2) 
(3) Cannot say 
(4) 
(5) Fully agree 15 
 
For the data analysis, the replies were coded from 1 to 5, as indicated above. 
 We find that although the ideology of candidates differ less within than between parties, 
there is significant within-party variation in ideology, making it possible that uninformed 
voters use candidates’ appearance as a cue when choosing an ideologically suitable candidate 
to vote for from a specific party. The party averages on the 1–5 scale are 1.7 for candidates 
from the National Coalition Party, 4.0 for candidates from the Social Democratic Party and 
4.2 for candidates from the Left Alliance. The standard deviations are between 0.7 and 0.9 
within the three parties. Importantly, in all three parties we have that each of the response 
alternatives on the 1–5 scale are chosen by some candidates, as displayed in Table D1.  
                                                     




Average ideological scores of candidates in the 2015 parliamentary election in Finland 
Response National Coalition Party Social Democratic Party Left Alliance 
Fully disagree (1) 41.3% 1.0% 1.6% 
(2) 52.9% 13.9% 8.4% 
Cannot say (3) 1.4% 1.5% 0.5% 
(4) 3.9% 56.4% 44.2% 
Fully agree (5) 0.5% 27.2% 45.3% 
Mean  1.69 3.95 4.23 
Standard Deviation 0.73 0.97 0.94 
Notes: Candidates’ responses relate to the statement “Labour income taxes should be increased on those with 
high incomes.” 
 
The data were provided by Helsingin Sanomat, using Creative Commons license CC BY-NC-
SA 4.0 (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/4.0/) and is available at 
http://dynamic.hs.fi/arkku/tiedostot/23821113ehdokasvastaukset-17-04.xlsx. The voting aid 
application is available at http://www.vaalikone.fi/eduskunta2015/ (in Finnish).  
 
